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THE ELDERLY in the United States, who once nearly always lived with their 
children, now reside apart from them. For older women, the most noteworthy 
shift has been toward solitary households. For men, the focus of the present 
study, the empty nest—which we define as made up of a married couple 
and no one else—has become the dominant living arrangement.1 Between 
1880 and 2000, the proportion of married men aged 60 and older living in 
an empty nest more than quadrupled, rising from 19 percent to 78 percent. 
We find that the transformation has an emphatic periodization, with most of 
the change occurring in the period from 1940 to 1970. We argue that long-
term demographic, cultural, and economic models cannot explain this abrupt 
shift. Instead, short-term demographic and economic conditions in this period 
provided the impetus for both the elderly and their adult children to achieve 
a persistent ideal of living in autonomous households.
Previous research
Two groups of scholars, whose work intermittently intersects, have examined 
the decline in co-residence of the elderly and their children, focusing on the 
“nuclearization” of the family, and, among the elderly, on older women in 
solitary households. The first group, mainly social scientists, has attempted to 
explain changes in American family structure after World War II. The second, 
chiefly historians, has sought to define family forms and family norms over 
the broad expanse of time before the mid-twentieth century. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, as censuses recorded abrupt changes in Ameri-
can households, demographers reported a societal shift toward small nuclear 
families in mid-adulthood and toward solitary households in young and older 
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adulthood (Beresford and Rivlin 1966; Kobrin 1976; for similar changes else-
where see Keilman 1988; Young and Grundy 2009). Household size decreased 
as a result of declining fertility, young adults setting up households of their 
own, and the elderly residing in empty nests and solitary households. These 
changes were salient given that the standard sociology of the family before 
that time assumed that large, extended households had been common in the 
past and were only slowly undermined by industrialization (Burgess 1916; 
Ogburn 1933; Parsons 1949; cf. Goode 1963). Even though such theory began 
to break down under closer historical scrutiny, the rapid postwar increase in 
autonomous households, particularly among the elderly, provoked a vigorous 
scholarship examining demographic, economic, and cultural explanations.
Glick revealed the demographic foundation for the increasingly isolated 
households of the elderly: earlier marriage, an earlier birth of the last child, 
and, most importantly, longer life expectancy (Glick and Parke 1965; Glick 
1977; see also Uhlenberg 1969, 1978). Women who had married between 
1900 and 1909 had 1.6 median years of joint survivorship with their husbands 
after the marriage of their last child; those born between 1920 and 1929 had 
9.3 years. Other scholars (Treas 1977; Treas and Bengston 1982) described 
steep declines in fertility that “reduced the number of descendants to whom 
an older person can turn for assistance” (1977: 486). Reductions in mortal-
ity and fertility operated in tandem to increase the length of time a couple 
would survive after childrearing and to reduce the number of children with 
whom they might live. Kobrin concluded that such “demographic changes 
operating on the population-marriage structure” undid nineteenth-century 
norms of co-residence, and led to “a general redefinition of the family toward 
invariable … nuclearity” (1976: 130). 
These studies provided hypothetical scenarios, rather than direct tests, 
of factors that increased the likelihood of generations living separately, and 
such purely demographic explanations did not go unchallenged. McGarry 
and Schoeni (2000) found that variation in the proportion of elderly widows 
living alone did not closely parallel the rise in life expectancy. Fertility decline 
also seemed an insufficient cause; Crimmins and Ingegneri (1990) found that 
the proportion of elderly persons with surviving direct descendants had in-
creased between 1962 and 1984. Moreover, although having more children 
increased the probability that an older person would live with a child, what 
mattered most was having at least one child (Kramarow 1995; Ruggles 1996). 
McGarry and Schoeni (2000) concluded that, for elderly widows, declining 
fertility could account for only 10 percent of the trend toward living alone 
after 1940. 
Economists argued that this “nuclearization” of the family followed 
directly from rising affluence, contending that well-being was always served 
by the privacy achieved by living in small, separate households. The elderly 
increasingly lived alone, not because they could not depend on their children 
B R I A N  G R A T T O N  /  M Y R O N  P .  G U T M A N N  333
but because they no longer had to. Once economic status reached a necessary 
critical level, parents and children seized the opportunity to live separately 
(Michael, Fuchs, and Scott 1980). The long-term decline in the co-residence 
of the elderly and their children correlated closely with long-term gains in 
the economic status of both generations (Bethencourt and Rios-Rull 2009; 
Costa 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 2000; Palloni 2000), and a significant re-
lationship appeared between income and household structure for a variety 
of age groups (Corson and McConnell 1956; Carliner 1975; Chevan and 
Korson 1972). Social Security benefits played a prominent role in economic 
explanations, since a guaranteed stream of income could reduce uncertainty 
about lifetime resources. Researchers regularly found correlations between 
Social Security benefits and the probability that the elderly would live alone 
(Schorr 1960; Bethencourt and Rios-Rull 2009; McGarry and Schoeni 2000; 
Costa 1997, 1999) 
Other scholars, however, suggested that neither demographic nor 
economic changes could fully explain the growing prevalence of nuclear 
and solitary households. They stressed the rise of a culture that valued in-
dependent and autonomous families; Americans used increasing affluence 
to achieve that new ideal (Beresford and Rivlin 1966). Pampel (1981, 1983) 
found that income alone explained only a small portion of the increase in 
solitary living between 1960 and 1976, arguing that much of this increase 
was the result of an “increased demand for…privacy and autonomy” (1981: 
170). Evidence for the effect of diverse norms also appeared in cross-cultural 
comparisons. Similarly developed countries in Europe and Asia had different 
levels of co-residence of the aged with their children (Murphy and Grundy 
1994), as did different ethnic and racial groups in the United States (Chevan 
and Korson 1972; Giuliano 2007; Zhou 1997). A large literature maintained 
that ethnocultural differences made some elderly more likely to live with 
their children (Burr and Mutchler 1999; Choi 1999; Giuliano 2007; Wilmoth 
2001; Zhou 1997). Such findings suggested both that culture mattered and 
that shifts in the ethnic composition of the US population might affect family 
living arrangements.
Social scientists studying change in the mid-twentieth century were 
aware of a rising interest among historians in family and household (e.g., Ko-
brin 1976). After 1970, new sources of historical data in Great Britain and the 
United States made it possible to study families in the past with greater confi-
dence. Historians began to seek the origins of family structure and to ascertain 
family values in previous eras (Thornton 2005). Major findings emerged first 
from the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social Structure. 
Using diverse records from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain, Pe-
ter Laslett and his colleagues, especially Richard Wall, made the startling claim 
that the English family was, even in distant times, overwhelmingly nuclear, 
and that this family form—and the values that sustained it—were persistent 
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and highly resistant to change (Laslett and Wall 1972). Arguing that neither 
industrialization nor welfare had important effects on family structure at least 
through the early twentieth century, Wall concluded that it was “impossible 
to sustain the view of a linear progression from pre-industrial times when 
the elderly lived with their children to modern times when they live on their 
own” (1984: 483; 1989, 2001, 2002). 
Subsequent work in the United States, especially by Hareven and Smith, 
confirmed these basic findings (e.g., Kertzer 1995; Hareven 1991, 1994, 1996; 
Chudacoff and Hareven 1979; Smith 1979, 1986), leading to a consensus 
that nuclearity and neolocality were deeply ingrained and persistent fam-
ily values among Northwest Europeans and their New World descendants.2 
Ruggles (1994) agreed that nineteenth-century US census data demonstrated 
that the nuclear family was the dominant form; he argued, however, that 
the dominance of the nuclear family resulted from patterns of fertility and 
mortality that made creating extended households unlikely. Because nearly 
all elderly persons who had surviving children lived with them, co-residence 
norms did exist. Other scholars confirmed the finding of co-residence, but dis-
agreed about the cause (Chudacoff and Hareven 1978; Smith 1979; Hareven 
1994). They argued that misfortune, rather than cultural values, compelled 
co-residence. Still, the fact that wealthier households were more likely to be 
extended in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries suggested that 
Americans exercised their preference for co-residence when capable of doing 
so (Smith 1979; Ruggles 1994, 2003). Rising economic standards during the 
twentieth century should have led to more extended households, rather than 
fewer; the fact that this did not happen implied a profound cultural change 
toward preference for autonomous households.
Ruggles (2003, 2007, 2009) later abandoned the theory of a normative 
shift, focusing instead on structural explanations. He provided quantitative 
evidence for Frédéric Le Play’s mid-nineteenth-century assertion that in-
dustrialization undermined family ties by offering the young an opportunity 
to escape patriarchal households (Silver 1982). In agricultural societies, the 
concentration of wealth in farm property made the young eager to please the 
old. In industrial economies, the young can live well on their own, and they 
are the ones who profit from autonomous living (cf. Brady 1958; Beresford 
and Rivlin 1966). Comparisons over time (Ruggles 2007) and across diverse 
societies (Ruggles 2009) revealed no cultural effect, no differential “propensity 
among the aged to reside with kin” (Ruggles 2009: 264).
Other historians found neither cultural nor structural change sufficient, 
and sought explanations for the shift toward autonomous households in a 
variety of economic, demographic, and political factors. They found that 
empty nest households among the elderly did not initially appear in the ur-
ban, industrial locales one would expect from a structural argument, but in 
rural settings, where successful North American farmers appeared to have 
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chosen to retire and live without their children (Haber and Gratton 1994; 
Costa 1995; Dillon, Gratton, and Moen 2010). Interpreting the high frequen-
cies of extended affluent households in the past as a cultural choice seemed 
unduly simplistic; the average income of extended households in the early 
twentieth century approximated that of the households most likely to be 
extended in the mid-twentieth century (Gratton 1986). As Michael, Fuchs, 
and Scott (1980) argued, a threshold income may finance extension, and a 
higher threshold income may then finance autonomous households. 
Historians have also developed broader interpretations of changing 
demographic conditions. Declines in fertility did not initially undermine co-
residence opportunities for the elderly (as long as at least one child survived), 
but such declines immediately raised the probability of co-residence for the 
reduced number of adult children (Gratton 1986; see Levy 1965; Kobrin 
1976; Ruggles 2007). Haber and Gratton (1994) argued that the increased 
likelihood that a young adult would be responsible for an aging parent led 
to widespread support in the United States for public pensions. Moreover, 
young adult children became more likely to move away from home in the 
mid-twentieth century owing to a set of unusual, exogenous factors, including 
wartime mobilization and the more widespread participation of young adults 
in university education (Gutmann, Pullum-Piñon, and Pullum 2002). 
The social scientific and historical literatures feature the same contest 
between demographic, cultural, and economic explanations for the increase 
in separate households among the elderly in the United States. The scholar-
ship suggests that declining fertility is not ipso facto responsible, since adult 
children remained available to aging parents. However, smaller families and 
greater longevity placed substantially greater demands upon adult children. 
Historical period effects, as well as distinct ethnic patterns, indicate to some 
scholars that preferences have changed over time or vary between cultural 
groups in the population. Economic conditions clearly determine the range 
of household choices available, and public and private pensions appear to be 
an especially attractive means for sustaining independent households, while 
reducing social tension over intergenerational burdens.
In their study of the elderly, the two literatures reviewed here have 
attended mainly to the fortunes of older women. In our research, we turn 
the focus to elderly men still living with their wives, the household con-
figuration we define as “empty nest.” We ask why these couples became 
increasingly less likely to live with their children or other family members. 
Given the explanatory models presented in previous studies, we require evi-
dence that allows a comparative assessment of demographic, cultural, and 
economic influences on the emergence of the empty nest. Such evidence, 
at its best, ought to represent all elderly men in the United States and in-
clude variables useful to measuring each hypothesized influence. Given the 
reference in all scholarship to enduring trends, the evidence must permit 
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an extended historical view and allow us to distinguish between long-term 
trends and abrupt change. 
Analysis
Data and variables
This research primarily employs samples of US census data from the Inte-
grated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS; Ruggles et al. 2004) for all decen-
nial census years from 1880 to 2000 except 1890, for which individual-level 
census data do not exist. IPUMS data reflect the circumstances of a represen-
tative sample of the US population and provide similar information about 
living arrangements across this period. While the census collects a rich variety 
of evidence, it lacks certain variables that would have been useful for this 
analysis (economic status, for example, is poorly measured in most years and 
culture at best is indirectly assessed), and the data are cross-sectional, rather 
than longitudinal. We also use a variety of other sources in the aggregate 
comparisons, identifying them where they are employed.
For the following analyses, we first exclude men residing in the incon-
sistently defined category of group quarters, and a few men whose household 
arrangements could not be ascertained; these exclusions amount to between 3 
percent and 6 percent of the original sample, depending on the year. We then 
selected all married men aged 60 and older with spouse present, though we 
also use comparative data for younger men in certain analyses. We excluded 
men whose spouse was absent, and men who were widowed, separated, 
divorced, or never married. The percentage excluded by these criteria rises 
from 25 percent in 1880 to 33 percent in 1930, then falls again to about 25 
percent after 1950. The proportion divorced increases across the series, and 
the proportion widowed declines. We classified each man into one of three 
household types:
—Empty nest (husband and wife, no others)
—Living with own child or children (in any household arrangement)
—Living in all other household arrangements
Aggregate comparisons
Table 1 shows the sample size and distribution of living arrangements for 
married men aged 60 and older. We first use these data in figures that com-
pare aggregate change in living arrangements to aggregate changes in other 
variables, and then turn to multivariate analysis of individual older men. The 
figures reveal a single historical period, 1940 to 1970, during which most 
of the change in the proportion of older married men living in the empty 
nest took place. The pronounced shift within this period, and the long-term 
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moderate trends on each side of it, raise questions about the plausibility of 
certain explanations proffered in the literature. Any useful model for the rise 
of the empty nest among older men must explain the sharp increase during 
this period.
Figure 1 contrasts the rise of the empty nest for married men aged 60 
and older to the simultaneous decline in the percentage living with one or 
more children. The latter share fell from over two-thirds of all men in 1880 
to about 17 percent in 2000. The proportion in the empty nest quadrupled, 
rising from 19 percent to over 78 percent. The figure reveals the critical peri-
odization mentioned earlier. From 1880 to 1940, increases in the empty nest 
are evident but moderate, rising about 3 percentage points per decade. After 
1940 a sharp change begins, lasting through 1970. In this 30-year period, 
the increase is greater than 11 percentage points per decade. After 1970, the 
rate slows dramatically, to an increase of 2 percentage points per decade. A 
linear regression line from 1880 to 1940 shows that, at the first period’s rate 
of increase, fewer than 60 percent of married men aged 60 and older would 
have been in the empty nest in the year 2000, instead of the nearly 80 percent 
reported. Using the points between 1940 and 1970, more than 90 percent 
of men would have been living in the empty nest by 1990. The regression 
line for 1970 to 2000 has a lower slope than the line from 1880 to 1940. The 
30-year interval from 1940 to 1970 represents a sharp break between past 
and present experience, accounting for more than half of the change over 
120 years. An adequate explanation for the emptying of the nest requires 
understanding these three distinct stages: the first, a long and moderate trend 
away from living with children; the second, a rapid shift of about 30 years’ 
TABLE 1   Married men aged 60 and older by living arrangement, 
United States, 1880–2000
 Empty nest With children Other
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Total
1880 1,956 19.4 6,979 69.3 1,135 11.3 10,070 
1900 3,745 23.3 10,459 65.1 1,855 11.6 16,061 
1910 5,407 27.0 12,449 62.1 2,192 10.9 20,050 
1920 7,869 31.0 14,981 59.0 2,546 10.0 25,396 
1930 11,411 35.9 16,638 52.3 3,747 11.8 31,796 
1940 16,362 38.5 21,230 50.0 4,859 11.5 42,451 
1950 28,997 52.8 20,127 36.6 5,825 10.6 54,949 
1960 48,343 66.1 18,495 25.3 6,345 8.7 73,183 
1970 64,163 72.7 18,892 21.4 5,253 6.0 88,307 
1980 83,518 76.2 20,996 19.2 5,078 4.6 109,592 
1990 96,547 76.6 24,436 19.4 5,127 4.1 126,110 
2000 105,892 78.4 23,596 17.5 5,574 4.1 135,062
SOURCE: See text.
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duration in which the empty nest became the predominant household form 
for older men; and the third, a recent, pronounced slowing of the trend. The 
gradual rates of increase in the first and third periods fit the slow transition 
implied in historical accounts: demographically, a long-term decline in fertility 
and a long-term increase in longevity, which reduced the number of children 
available to the aging parents’ household and lengthened the period between 
the end of childrearing and the death of either spouse; culturally, a slow shift 
in attitudes about appropriate living arrangements; and economically, steady 
increases in affluence and long-term structural shifts such as the decline of 
an agricultural economy. The sharp transition between 1940 and 1970 is not 
adequately explained by these models. 
After World War II, social scientists recognized this sudden change, but 
the demographic, cultural, and economic explanations they offered do not 
completely account for the periodization of the shift. We convey the strengths 
and weaknesses of demographic explanations for the rise of the empty nest 
through Figures 2 and 3. In Figure 2 we compare the expectation of life at 
age 60 for white men in the United States with the proportion of married 
white men aged 60 and older living in an empty nest. This comparison fixes 
attention on demographic potential: we expect that as men (and their wives) 
lived longer, they had more time after their children had grown to live by 
themselves in the empty nest. Longer joint survival does not automatically 







































FIGURE 1   Percent of married men aged 60 and older living in an 
empty nest and living with children, with regression (dashed) lines
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of joint survival in the late nineteenth century, all children could have left 
the parental home—but increased and increasingly secure longevity, we ar-
gue, made expectation and preparation for separate households much more 
likely in both generations. As shown in Figure 2, life expectancy for older 
white men increased slowly but steadily from 1880 to 1970, followed by a 
more rapid increase from 1970 to 2000. Life expectancy and prevalence in 
the empty nest grew in parallel from 1880 until 1940; then the percent in 
empty nests surged upward, outpacing changes in remaining years of life 
expectancy. The subsequent rapid increase in life expectancy since 1970 and 
the stabilization in the empty nest bring the two trends together again. The 
conclusion we draw is that the long, slow increase in life expectancy from 
1880 to 1940 correlates well with a moderate rise in the empty nest for men, 
but the continued slow rise in life expectancy cannot explain the surge in the 
empty nest between 1940 and 1970.
In Figure 3 we turn to fertility, assessing the effects of the availability of 
children on parents’ living arrangements. We compare the total completed 
fertility of cohorts of US women born from 1868 to 1932 (Heuser 1976) and 
the projected fertility of women born through 1941 (Ryder 1986) to the per-
centage of married men aged 60 and older living in an empty nest 60 years 
later. For example, the living arrangements of older men in 1970 correspond 







































































FIGURE 2   Life expectancy of men at age 60 and percent of 
married men aged 60 and older living in an empty nest: 
White men only, United States, 1880–2000
Life expectancy
Empty nest
SOURCES: For percent in empty nest, see text. For life expectancy, 1880–1990: Haines 2006, Table Ab676; for
2000: Arias et al. 2008.
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are not available before the 1868 cohort, this comparison begins with the 
1930 census and focuses on the period of rapid growth in the proportion of 
men living in an empty nest from 1940 to 1970 and the subsequent slowing 
of this growth. We invert the fertility scale (on the right) to visually compare 
the largely declining cohort fertility rates with the increasing percentage of 
men living in the empty nest (left scale). The figure demonstrates a steady 
decline in fertility through the 1908 birth cohort. Fertility then increases 
through the 1932 cohort and is projected to fall again thereafter. The pro-
portion of older men living in an empty nest increases only slightly between 
the 1930 and 1940 censuses, while fertility for women born 60 years earlier 
declines rapidly. After the 1940 census, growth in the proportion of older 
men living in an empty nest outpaces fertility decline. The increase in fer-
tility that begins with the birth cohort of 1909 corresponds to a slowing in 
the rate of growth of the empty nest for older men after 1970, although the 
proportion in empty nests still continues to increase. These trend lines dem-
onstrate some concordance between fertility and the living arrangements 
of older men: more men inhabit an empty nest as the number of children 



















































Female birth cohort/Census year
FIGURE 3   Correspondence between total cohort fertility of women 
born 1868–1932 and projected through 1941 and percent of married 
men aged 60 and older living in an empty nest 60 years later
Cumulative fertility
at age 49 (Heuser)
Empty nest
(60 years later)
NOTE: The data are offset by 60 and 65 years, so the percent living in an empty nest corresponds to census data 
collected 60 and 65 years after the indicated birth cohort.
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was well underway before the critical shift toward the empty nest begin-
ning in 1940, and the parents of the baby boom generations were still more 
likely to live in empty nests than were men reaching old age before 1970, 
suggesting that fertility alone cannot account for the observed changes in 
living arrangements. 
Scholars studying changes in family norms have described slow shifts 
across time, insisting that family values, as expressed in family living arrange-
ments, are highly resistant to change (Wall 2002). The period between 1880 
and 1940 can fit such arguments. The abrupt transition between 1940 and 
1970, on the other hand, would require a sharp cultural change. Census data, 
while largely silent on cultural factors, permit one useful exploration, relying 
on the scholarship that holds that distinct ethnic cultures led to distinct family 
forms. Figure 4 indicates the proportion of immigrant men from a variety of 
ethnic groups and immigration periods who live in an empty nest, as well as 
proportions for native white and native black men.3 The figure illustrates why 
ethnocultural arguments have often been persuasive: at any census point, 
distinctions may exist among men of different ethnic backgrounds. More im-
pressive, however, is the shared shift toward the empty nest as immigration 
slowed after 1920, a change that occurs regardless of cultural background. 
Period 1 (mid-nineteenth-century) immigrants, such as Germans, exhibit 
the moderate rise in empty nest living arrangements to 1940, rapid rise until 
1970, and modest increases thereafter characteristic of native white men in 


























FIGURE 4   Percent of married men aged 60 and older living in an empty 









NOTE: Period 1 = mid-nineteenth century; Period 2 = early twentieth century; Period 3 = late twentieth century.
SOURCE: See text.
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those three periods. Period 2 (early-twentieth-century) immigrants, such as 
Italians, show flat or declining rates to 1940, a sharp rise in the empty nest 
between 1940 and 1970, and modest increases thereafter. Period 3 (late-
twentieth-century) immigrants exhibit low proportions in the empty nest in 
the current period. Mexicans, the only group to arrive in high volume in both 
Period 2 and Period 3, show patterns in living arrangements characteristic of 
both periods. While all share in the sharp transition, trends also fit immigra-
tion history: for each chronologically defined group, fewer live in the empty 
nest during their period of large-scale immigration, and the end of immigra-
tion makes that living arrangement more common. Thus the demography of 
immigration may be one cause for the periodization observed.
Long-term economic trends also provide some concordance with the 
three periods. Figure 5 compares the trend in GDP per capita with the per-
centage of married men aged 60 and older living in the empty nest, with GDP 
values scaled to 100 in 1880. The moderate increases in the empty nest in 
the period before 1940 exceed those in GDP per capita, but there are paral-
lel shifts toward rapid increases after 1940, and GDP rises more steeply than 
empty nest residence in the last decades.4
Figure 6 employs income data for individuals between 1950 and 2000. 
It contrasts the empty nest percentage among married men aged 60 and older 
with their median income, scaled to 100 in 1950, and median income for all 





























































FIGURE 5   Correspondence between an index of real GDP per capita 
(in 2000 dollars) and percent of married men aged 60 and older living 
in an empty nest: United States, 1880–2000
Per capita GDP
Empty nest
SOURCES: For percent in empty nest, see text. For GDP, Johnston and Williamson 2008.
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cannot display 1940 figures because the census collected only wage income in 
that year, and median wage income for older men was 0. But mean income 
(not displayed) increased sharply between 1940 and 1950 for both age groups, 
so the rapid rise shown between 1950 and 1970 is likely to extend back to 
1940. The figure reveals a strong correlation between the steep increase in 
empty nest households through 1970 and an equally steep increase in me-
dian income for older men and their children’s cohort. After 1980, however, 
while older men’s income continues to rise, income of men aged 35–44 falls, 
corresponding to continued but modest increases in the empty nest after that 
year. Because median income for women aged 35–44 was 0 in 1940 and 1950, 
we do not display their trends, but women’s mean income did not stagnate, 
continuing to rise through 2000.5 The abrupt increase in resources seen in 
these data for all age groups between 1940 and 1970 becomes a prime can-
didate for explaining sharp increases in empty nest living in that period, and 
the slowing down of that trend may be linked in part to the lack of income 
gains for younger men after 1980.
Availability of Social Security also appears to explain the observed pe-
riodization, since it changed radically in the critical period. In 1940, Social 
Security benefits were meager and covered a very small proportion of the 
elderly population. By 1950, the rapid expansion of Old Age Assistance ben-

























































FIGURE 6   Correspondence between an index of median income 
for married men aged 60 and older and all men aged 35–44 and 
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expect a steady stream of income that did not depend on work. By 1960 Old 
Age Insurance benefits were guaranteed, were larger in average value, and 
were available to nearly all elderly Americans (Haber and Gratton 1994). 
Figure 7 shows, however, that it is unlikely such benefits can fully account 
for the dominance of the empty nest. The figure compares the percentages 
living in the empty nest among married men in three age groups: 65 and over, 
62–64, and 50–61—the first always eligible for Social Security, the second 
eligible beginning in 1970, and the third never eligible. For each group we 
find the same pattern. Moderate upward trends in empty nest living until 
about 1940 give way to sharp increases through at least 1960, succeeded by 
modest change in the last decades of the twentieth century. Men aged 62–64, 
who were ineligible for benefits until 1970, shift rapidly toward the empty 
nest before that year. For those aged 50–61, who are never eligible, the trend 
is more modest, but again features a sharp rise between 1940 and 1960. The 
participation of ineligible persons in this historical periodization means that 
Social Security itself cannot fully explain the phenomenon, unless we grant 
a very large role to anticipation of benefits. Social Security may have been 
part of the package that allowed eligible persons to finance the empty nest, 
but income increases independent of Social Security had to have funded the 
shift for many families.
Ruggles (2007, 2009) has recently revived a structural explanation for 


























































FIGURE 7   Effects of access to Social Security benefits illustrated by 
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farm household. Figure 8 explores this argument by displaying the propor-
tion of married men 60 and older living in the empty nest by location (farm 
household, rural nonfarm, and an urban place with 2,500 persons or more), 
the proportion of the total US population (of any age) living in urban areas, 
and the proportion of the workforce engaged in nonfarm occupations. The 
three-period shift is evident for older men wherever they live: slow increases 
before 1940, rapid increases from 1940 to 1970, and modest increases after 
that date. Neither the proportion living in urban places nor the proportion in 
nonfarm occupations mirrors the sharp period of change. Moreover, the tran-
sition from an agriculturally based society is largely complete in the United 
States by 1940: nearly 60 percent of the population lived in urban places, and 
80 percent had nonfarm occupations. Over the long term, the disappearance 
of farm households may have undermined the structural grounds for co-resi-
dence, but it cannot explain a rapid shift after 1940, or one that occurred for 
men living outside its realm. 
These comparative exercises suggest that long-term demographic, cul-
tural, and economic causal models cannot sufficiently explain the rise of the 
empty nest. The sharp transition between 1940 and 1970 does appear to rely 
on unusually rapid economic gains for all age groups in this period, and the 
































































FIGURE 8   Percent of population urban and in nonfarm occupations 
and percent of married men aged 60 and older living in an empty nest by 
urban or rural residence: United States, 1880–2000
Nonfarm occupation
SOURCES: Urban population 1880–1990: Haines 2006, Tables Aa716 and Aa728; nonfarm employment 1880–
1990: Sobek 2001; urban population 2000: US Census Bureau 2000, Summary File 1, Table GCT-P1; nonfarm 
employment 2000: US Census Bureau 2000: Summary File 3, Table GCT-P13.
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as these comparisons are, they do not tell us how these variables influenced 
individual older men, or how they worked in conjunction with one another. 
We therefore employ multivariate analysis of individual-level sample data to 
assess factors that influenced the probability that married men aged 60 and 
older would live in an empty nest.
Multivariate analyses
The analysis first employs separate multinomial regressions for each census 
year from 1880 to 2000 (excluding 1890). We comment on these but display 
full results only for two pooled models, the first for 1880 to 1930 and the 
second for 1940 to 1990. We choose this division because, from 1940 to 1990, 
the census provided a variable indicating the number of children ever born 
to the wives of older men.6 In the earlier period, only the 1900 and 1910 
censuses had such data, so the pooled model does not include that measure; 
we use the 1900 and 1910 censuses with and without the fertility variable to 
assess the possible consequences of its absence. In each of the pooled models, 
we include census year variables to assess trends not captured in the other 
independent variables. The dependent variable is household structure, using 
the three living arrangement categories for married men described earlier: 1) 
empty nest (husband and wife only); 2) at least one own child (other kin and 
non-kin could also be present); 3) living in any other arrangement. 
Although there are multiple outcomes, we focus here on the relative 
importance of the empty nest as a living arrangement, and it is the excluded, 
comparative category. Thus a logistic regression coefficient indicates whether 
the variable has a positive or negative effect on the probability that a man would 
live in a category other than the empty nest. We report results in Table 2 (for 
1880 to 1930) and Table 3 (for 1940 to 1990). Age has the expected effect in 
both the early and later pooled models. Across 120 years, higher age increases 
the likelihood that men will live in an empty nest rather than with children or 
in other arrangements—for living with children, the magnitude of the effect 
increases from –0.044 in the first period to –0.059 in the second. The second 
expected and powerful variable, shown in the second period only, reflects fertil-
ity: the more children the wife of an older man had, the higher the likelihood of 
co-residence. In individual census years, this variable is remarkably consistent; 
even in the models for the 1900 and 1910 censuses, the coefficient has a mag-
nitude quite similar to that in individual census and pooled models.
Controlling for expected age and fertility effects, other variables show 
greater variability across time. A consistently available measure of socioeco-
nomic status in IPUMS is the socioeconomic index (SEI), which ranks men 
by reported occupation on the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (Ruggles et al. 
2004). A temporal shift is evident: between 1880 and 1930, higher SEI makes 
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empty nest. In contrast, between 1940 and 1990 (and in the 2000 census re-
gression), higher SEI makes living in an empty nest more likely. In the later 
period a man reporting no occupation is likely to be retired, and the response 
is linked to an increased likelihood of living in an empty nest. In the earlier 
period, when the same response may indicate poverty and dependency, the 
variable is not significant. Before 1940, the census provided only literacy as an 
education measure; between 1880 and 1930, being literate makes the empty 
nest more likely than living with children or in other household forms. In the 
later period, specifying the children ever born variable required that we use 
the wife’s educational level (models using the husband’s education yielded 
broadly similar results); we find that a wife’s higher education increases the 
probability of living in an empty nest. In summary, in the period 1940 to 1990 
higher socioeconomic status leads to the empty nest. Socioeconomic status 
effects are mixed in the earlier period. Although individual-year regressions 
reveal a monotonic decline in the positive effect of SEI for living with children 
or in other arrangements between 1880 and 1930, the effect remains clearly 
visible in the early twentieth century. 
Location variables are strongly affected by the inclusion of a fertil-
ity measurement, so that results from 1880 to 1930 exaggerate the farm 
household’s positive effect on living with children.7 In the later period, after 
controlling for the number of children born, elderly men living on farms are 
no more likely than their urban counterparts to reside with their children or 
in other arrangements. What stands out in both periods is that rural couples 
are the most likely to dwell in an empty nest. Preliminary regression analyses 
confirmed that ethnicity has little impact on living arrangements, although 
race and immigrant status do matter. Older black men are more likely than 
older white men to live with children or in other arrangements rather than 
in the empty nest, and these differences become substantially stronger after 
1930. The inclusion of a fertility measure weakens the effects of immigration. 
Still, even when holding the number of children constant, being an immi-
grant—and particularly being of Mexican birth—makes it more likely that an 
older man will live with his children. 
Variables for each year measure the trend not captured by the other 
specified variables. In the first model, where 1910 is the excluded year, the 
secular pattern moves monotonically toward the empty nest. Net of other 
variables, men enumerated before 1910 are more likely than men canvassed 
in that year to live with children or in other arrangements rather than in an 
empty nest, while those canvassed in 1920 and 1930 are less likely to do so. 
For the period 1940 to 1990, 1970 is the excluded year; holding constant 
other factors (such as the rise in fertility during the baby boom), the trend 
is again monotonic toward living in an empty nest. Thus, controlling for the 
variables we have included, there is a consistent shift toward the empty nest 
from 1880 forward, and most rapidly in the critical period 1940 to 1970.
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Discussion and conclusion 
Two groups of scholars have sought to explain change over time in American 
family structure. Each has explored the troika of demography, culture, and 
economics. Social scientists examined mid-twentieth-century transitions, 
but without a broad historical framework. In contrast, historians debated 
the longue durée before the mid-twentieth century, giving little attention to 
the more recent period. In assessing the ascendancy of the empty nest liv-
ing arrangement among older men, we argue that a satisfactory explanatory 
model must account for a striking periodization. After a long period of slow 
change, dating from at least 1880 until 1930, a sharp and extraordinary shift 
occurred in little over a single generation, from 1940 to 1970. After that 
year, only modest increases have been seen in the proportion of empty nest 
households. We conclude that economic factors provide the best explanation 
for this periodization, although demographic factors, including immigration 
rates, also contribute to the patterns observed. 
We base these conclusions on evidence from aggregate comparisons 
and micro-level data for a representative sample of married men aged 60 and 
older, drawn from United States censuses. In the aggregate comparisons, we 
recognize that correlation is not causation, but a lack of correlation between 
proportions living in an empty nest and other indexes makes certain explana-
tions problematic. Long-term gains in life expectancy are closely linked to the 
slow change in living arrangements before 1940, but do not correspond to the 
30-year period of abrupt transformation that followed. A decrease in fertility 
corresponds to but also predates the critical period, while the dramatic mid-
century boom in fertility has not stopped—though it may have slowed—the 
shift toward the empty nest. These demographic indexes taken together high-
light the issue of social burden featured in some recent scholarly arguments: 
longer life expectancy might not lead to the empty nest, as long as there were 
still surviving children, but falling fertility raised the likelihood that any one 
child would bear the increasingly long burden of co-residence. 
Cultural measures in census data are at best indirect, but they provide 
no confirmation of possible ethnocultural effects on living arrangements. 
Moreover, because diverse ethnic groups moved toward the empty nest in 
the critical period, a cultural shift in the majority population would have had 
to convert a wide variety of immigrants and their children. Immigration itself 
is a more promising force for change: between the mass immigration eras 
of 1880–1930 and 1970–2000 lies an era of modest immigration, when the 
empty nest became more common. Periods of mass arrival—as in the case 
of Mexico-born persons both early in the twentieth century and in its last 
decades—reduce the probability of empty nest living arrangements. 
Economic indexes also help explain the change. Aggregate GDP per 
capita as well as individual income gains and income stagnation for older 
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and younger age groups follows the three-period pattern. The relatively 
slow growth in affluence until 1940 is followed, through 1970, by striking 
gains for all age groups. Income levels thereafter decline or stagnate for men 
aged 35–44 (though not for women of that age), and this period sees only 
modest increases in the empty nest. In contrast, Social Security benefits, 
often invoked to explain independent living among the elderly, cannot be 
responsible for the rapid rise of empty nest households among persons ineli-
gible to receive benefits. Finally, no apparent relationship exists between the 
large-scale abandonment of the farm economy or rural life and the abrupt 
transition to the empty nest. Declines in farming may influence long-term 
trends, but they do not correspond to the periodization of change in living 
arrangements during the twentieth century. Most Americans were no longer 
living on farms or employed in agriculture by 1940, when the most rapid and 
important change began to occur.
Regression analysis of factors influencing the household living arrange-
ments of individual older men provided corroborative evidence, controlling 
for a variety of hypothesized factors. The effect of age grew stronger across 
the 120-year time period observed, while fertility maintained a nearly con-
stant influence. Farm households were no different from urban ones by the 
mid-twentieth century. Being of foreign birth, net of differences in fertility 
and socioeconomic status, always reduced the probability that an older man 
would live in an empty nest. The slowing rate of change in empty nest living 
after 1970 for all Americans can be traced in part to the renewal of mass im-
migration in the current period. No simple explanation presents itself for this 
outcome. Immigrants of diverse cultural backgrounds may share socioeco-
nomic differences from the native-born population (e.g., lack of assimilation 
and facility in English) not captured in our models. After 1940, higher occu-
pational status became more strongly linked to the empty nest. Educational 
measures followed the same pattern. Neither, however, is well-measured 
across the data series. Still, given that economic resources for all age groups 
underwent one of the sharpest expansions in US history in this postwar pe-
riod, a heightened capacity to achieve something desired—the autonomous 
household—is the best single candidate for explaining the uniqueness of the 
critical period from 1940 to 1970. A positive linkage with the socioeconomic 
index occurs in the later period, when affluence rose rapidly for nearly all 
Americans. Why SEI was not linked to the empty nest before 1940 remains 
unexplained—this effect may be cultural, as some have argued; or it may 
be that economic resources were beneath the threshold that permits empty 
nest living, as others propose; or it may be that economic resources were still 
linked to inheritances that children counted on.
Culture might also bear on the more recent period, and it may exert 
itself in the strong year effects in the 1940 to 1990 model. Some have argued 
that demographic pressures transformed a previous ideal of co-residence. As 
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fertility fell, maintaining that ideal would have required that the coefficient 
for number of children born rise substantially, instead of remaining largely 
constant. Studies more sensitive to culture, and better able to demonstrate its 
effects or the lack thereof, will be needed to assess that question. But in the 
mid-twentieth-century United States, increasingly well-off Americans, from a 
wide variety of backgrounds, sought to establish autonomous households. In 
an extraordinary 30-year period, elderly men, their wives, and their children 
largely accomplished that objective. 
Notes
Figures in this article are available in color in 
the electronic edition of the journal.
This research has been supported by Grant 
Number R01AG020705 from the US National 
Institute on Aging. The National Science 
Foundation of the United States provided sup-
port to Myron Gutmann for his work on this 
article. Any opinion, finding, and conclusions 
or recommendations expressed in this mate-
rial are those of Myron Gutmann and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the National 
Science Foundation.
For contributions to this article we 
thank Lijie Cao, Vince Field, Wenkai Tong, 
and in particular our colleague Emily Rose 
Merchant.
1 We have chosen to analyze older men 
separately, not only because the more com-
plex living arrangements of older women 
make a combined analysis difficult, but also 
because the households of men have been less 
commonly studied.
2 In emphasizing cultural forces, these 
scholars traveled the road common to early 
historians of the elderly (Fischer 1977; Achen-
baum 1978; Haber 1983).
3 We place those immigrants not spe-
cifically identified in three categories: Period 
1, those from countries whose immigrants 
largely arrived in the mid-nineteenth century 
(e.g., Ireland); Period 2, those from countries 
of early-twentieth-century immigration (e.g., 
Poland); Period 3, those from countries whose 
immigrants arrived mainly after World War II 
(e.g., China).
4 We do not normalize the empty nest 
percentage since, unlike GDP per capita, it 
has an upward bound. When both variables 
are normalized, the same parallel change can 
be seen until 1990, when change in GDP per 
capita begins to exceed change in empty nest 
residence.
5 In absolute terms, income was always 
higher for younger than for older men. In 
1999 dollars, income for men aged 35–44 
rose from $21,350 to $35,000 between 1950 
and 2000, while for married men aged 60 and 
older, it rose from $10,850 to $25,450. The 
rate of increase for older men was, however, 
substantially greater after 1960 (and the abso-
lute level for younger men peaked in 1980), 
leading to the standardized curves in Figure 
6. The series in IPUMS data produces steeper 
declines after 1980 in younger men’s real in-
come than declines captured in other series, 
such as in US Census Bureau (2007).
6 No census enumerates children born 
or surviving for men, and only the 1900 and 
1910 censuses provide information on chil-
dren surviving for women.
7 After 1940, census confidentiality rules 
restricted identification of certain locations; 
sample members living in these locations were 
placed in the category “Unidentified.”
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